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Abstract
This paper studies the role of stabilization policy in a model where ￿rm entry
responds to shocks and uncertainty. We evaluate stabilization policy in the context of
a simple analytically solvable sticky price model, where ￿rms have to prepay a ￿xed
cost of entry. The presence of endogenous entry can alter the dynamic response to
shocks, leading to greater persistence in the e⁄ects of monetary and real shocks. Entry
a⁄ects welfare, depending on the love of variety in consumption and investment, as well
as its implications for market competitiveness. In this context, monetary policy has
an additional role in regulating the optimal number of entrants, as well as the optimal
level of production at each ￿rm. We ￿nd that the same monetary policy rule optimal
for regulating the scale of production in familiar sticky price models without entry, also
generates the amount of (endogenous) entry corresponding to a ￿ ex-price equilibrium.
JEL classi￿cation: E22, E52, L16
Keywords: productivity, monetary policy, market dynamics.
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11 Introduction
Business cycles are characterized by sizeable investment dynamics of ￿rm entry and exit.
Just as real and monetary shocks may lead ￿rms to adjust the scale of production, they also
create opportunities to introduce new goods in the market, as lower costs or higher demand
raise the pro￿tability of new product lines. A small but dynamic strand of literature has
recently reconsidered di⁄erent dimensions in which models with ￿rm entry and product va-
riety can contribute to our understanding of the business cycle in closed and open economies
(e.g. Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Jaimovich, 2004). These aim to provide a more realistic
model of imperfectly competitive markets in manufacturing, where entry drives pro￿ts to
zero and generate plausible market dynamics; in some versions, they also shed light on the
role of research and development in generating economic ￿ uctuations.1 The question we
investigate in this paper is their monetary policy dimension.
One can list several reasons why business cycle researchers should be interested in ￿rm
entry. Firstly, we see strong empirical evidence that entry dynamics comove with the busi-
ness cycle, a stylized fact that will be discussed below. Secondly, entry has the potential
to serve as an ampli￿cation and propagation mechanism for real shocks, and to a⁄ect the
transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Thirdly entry may have notable welfare ef-
fects, to the degree that households derive utility from greater variety, or to the degree that
the entry of new ￿rms raises competition in a market. By way of example, under a standard
Dixit-Stiglitz speci￿cation with a substitution elasticity implying a 20% markup, a one per-
cent decrease in consumption expenditure lowers the total consumption index by 20% more
if it corresponds to 1 percent reduction in the number of varieties bought by the consumers,
rather than a proportional fall in the consumption of each variety.2 This example illustrates
that the extensive margin of consumption and output ￿ uctuations, in the form of changes in
the number of ￿rms and varieties, can have distinct implications from the intensive margin,
the average size of ￿rms. Thus, as a ￿nal point, in light of its e⁄ect on welfare we expect
entry to a⁄ect the design of optimal monetary policy, as output gap stabilization may now
1Recent open macro literature has explored the role of ￿rm entry in the international business cycle,
and analyzed international spillovers from policy and productivity shocks. (See Ghironi and Melitz, 2005;
Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti, 2005, among others.) Some contributions have also reconsidered issues of the
welfare e⁄ects of product varieties ￿ with potentially relevant implications for the design of international
and domestic price indexes. (See the above contribution and Broda and Weinstein, 2004). Some traits of
these models are in common with a related literature on ￿rm entry focusing on issues of indeterminacy of
equilibria and increasing returns. (See Chatterjee et al., 1993; Devereux et al., 1996; and Kim, 2004).









￿￿1 c(h): Writing this in percent changes: e C = ￿
￿￿1e n + e c(h): For a typical
case of ￿ = 6; a percentage rise in the number of varieties n a⁄ects total C by 1.2 times as much as an equal
percentage rise in average size c(h).
2have an extensive as well as an intensive margin.
In this paper, we ￿rst brie￿ y document the correlation of entry with monetary shocks,
augmenting standard VAR models with measures of new ￿rm incorporations and net busi-
ness formation. Second, we build a stylized sticky price model of monetary policy when
￿rm entry is endogenous. Firms must prepay a (possibly time-varying) ￿xed cost in the
period prior to production, which is the cost of an exogenously given quantity of interme-
diate inputs that are necessary to start up production. This startup ￿xed cost must be
paid each period ￿ it could be interpreted as investment expenditure under the simplifying
assumption of complete depreciation of capital within the period. Firms cover such cost
with their pro￿ts derived from monopolistic pricing. As demand and cost are a⁄ected by
shocks, the number of ￿rms that ￿nd it pro￿table to enter the market will vary over time.
Di⁄erent from the standard speci￿cation, ￿rms enter the market by producing new di⁄eren-
tiated products, thus enlarging the set of goods available to consumers and other ￿rms. We
allow for love for variety in preferences, so that enlarging the set of goods may have positive
e⁄ects on household utility. Price stickiness takes the form of prices that are set one period
in advance.
We ￿nd that entry a⁄ects the transmission of technology shocks as well as monetary
policy transmission. With endogenous entry, the e⁄ect of productivity shocks on output
is magni￿ed by the increase in investment demand driven by new ￿rms. With free entry,
most of the output e⁄ect can be attributed to the creation of new ￿rms and products, i.e.
to the extensive margins. Monetary shocks also induce entry much as investment responds
in a standard model: for a given entry (investment) cost, a fall in the real interest rate
raises the expected discounted pro￿ts from creating a new ￿rm. Di⁄erent from the standard
model, however, ￿rms investing in new capital stock do not raise the scale of production of
a given set of products (i.e. to exploit intensive margins) ￿ facing a fall in their equilibrium
prices. Product di⁄erentiation (i.e. exploiting extensive margins) allow them to operate
with limited or no deterioration of their prices. As with productivity shocks, endogenous
entry tends to generate some endogenous persistence in response to monetary shocks, though
these particular e⁄ects are not large in the calibrated version of the model.
Our stylized model allows us to evaluate analytically monetary policy. We ￿rst show
that there exists a simple class of policy rules such that the market allocation with nominal
rigidities coincides with a market allocation where all prices are ￿ exible. This class of policy
is isomorphic to the one studied in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b), in the context of a model
without ￿rm entry and investment. In an economy with these rules in place, the individual
good prices p are constant, but the welfare-based CPI ￿ uctuates with entry. For exactly this
3reason, the goal of (welfare-based) CPI stability may not be a good target for policy makers.
To the extent that it is desirable to support a ￿ ex price allocation, monetary authorities
should stabilize ￿rms￿marginal costs and producers￿prices. The price index may then
freely ￿ uctuate with entry, providing information about ￿ uctuation in consumption utils
￿ given prices ￿ that households enjoy. The reason for this is similar to the reason
underlying a well known result on optimal policy in open economy, whereas price stability
call for stabilizing the domestic GDP de￿ ator, and let the CPI move as to accommodate for
equilibrium ￿ uctations in the relative price of imports (e.g. see Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a).
However, the allocation in a ￿ exible price equilibrium will not be in general Pareto
optimal. There are three distortions in our economy: monopoly power in production, under
or oversupply of varieties, and nominal rigidities. Correcting the ￿rst two distortions requires
an appropriate set of taxes and subsidies. Only if these are in place, can monetary policy
be e⁄ective in targeting the e¢ cient allocation.
We study two important macroeconomic consequences of lack of macroeconomic stabi-
lization in our distorted economy. First, as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b), the lack of
monetary stabilization translates into higher product prices. As a result, insu¢ cient sta-
bilization lowers the average scale of activity of all ￿rms in existence. Second ￿ this is a
speci￿c contribution of our paper ￿ we show that the lack of stabilization lowers the average
number of ￿rms relative to a ￿ ex price allocation. This result is not obvious, since higher
prices set by ￿rms against increasing uncertainty tend to rise pro￿ts in equilibrium, hence
creating an incentive to enter. Our analytical welfare analysis ￿nds that unconditional ex-
pected welfare is unambiguously lower under a lack of stabilization, for all parameterizations
of love for variety. But the welfare gains of stabilization policy rise with greater love for
variety, potentially by a notable percentage ￿ of the same order of magnitude as average
markup.
We conclude our analysis by augmenting our model to explore the e⁄ects of ￿rm entry
on market competitiveness. We adapt a translog preference speci￿cation: new entry of ￿rms
raises the density of market competition and the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
This forces ￿rms to lower their markups and thereby reduces the monopolistic distortion
in the economy. We show that this reallocates adjustment between extensive and intensive
margins, and it o⁄ers an additional motivation for stabilization policy as a means of raising
welfare.3
3Since we focus on stabilization policy, we abstract from the growth dimension stressed by other macro-
economic models with entry, namely, the link between the creation of new ￿rms and technological change
when progress is embodied in new capital (e.g. Campbell 1998). Nonetheless, we observe that our model
shares two standard predictions with this literature. First, current productivity shocks lead to entry ￿ in
this sense, entry is procyclical. Second, future productivity shocks leads to exit. The reason is however
4A related paper in the recent literature is by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2005), which
studies the dynamics of entry along the business cycle. In addition to di⁄erences in the
model speci￿cation, while their focus is on cyclical properties of the macroeconomic process
with ￿rm entry, we concentrate on stabilization policy issues.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the ￿ exible price equilibrium and compares it to the Pareto optimal allocation. The
next two sections analyze monetary transmission and policy rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 A look at the evidence
As empirical motivation for our inquiry, Figure 1 plots two metrics of entry, the U.S. index of
net business formation and the number of new incorporations. The comovements with GDP
are obvious, with correlations as high as 0.73 and 0.53, respectively. While the comovement
with output has been noted in earlier research (see e.g. Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2005;
Jaimovich, 2004; Devereux et al., 1996), we go on here to document a relationship with
monetary policy. To this goal, simple unconditional correlations are not appropriate. Indeed,
if one uses the increase in nonborrowed reserves ratio to total reserves as an indicator of an
expansionary monetary policy stance, its unconditional correlations with the above measures
of entry are negative (-0.28 and -0.18), rather than positive as one might expect. Similarly,
the correlation with the federal funds rate has di⁄erent sign (-0.04 and 0.06) depending on the
measure of entry, whereas one may instead expect an unambiguously negative correlation
with this indicator of monetary contraction. Clearly, a likely problem is that monetary
policy is adjusted counter to business cycle ￿ uctuations, so the unconditional correlations
are likely con￿ ating endogenous monetary contractions with the booms in GDP that may
have given rise to them.
Using even a simple VAR to separate these e⁄ects gives a dramatically di⁄erent and much
clearer picture. First, we follow Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) in specifying a VAR ordering
the nonborrowed reserves ratio after industrial production and consumer prices. In addition,
we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) by including sensitive commodity prices
to control the price puzzle. In this system we insert in turn each of our measures of entry.4
di⁄erent from the obsolescence of current capital. Rather, exit is due to the anticipation of a fall in prices
and sales revenue due to productivity gains in a (monopolistic) competitive environment.
4The full list of variables in order are: industrial production, CPI, commodity prices, non-borrowed
reserves ratio, and net business formation (or new incorporations). The ￿rst two and the ￿nal series are
in logs. Data is monthly, running from 1959:1 to1996:9 when incorporations are used and to 1994:12 for
net business formation. The entry series have been discontinued, with net business formation obtained
from Economagic, and incorporations from the Survey of Current Business. Identi￿cation is by Cholesky
decomposition, where monetary policy can respond contemporaneously to production, CPI, and commodity
prices.
5Figure 1a shows that now there is a statistically signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of nonborrowed
reserves on net business formation; ￿gure 1b shows a similar e⁄ect on incorporations, with
signi￿cance starting in the eight month after the shock. Then, as in Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995), we also include the federal funds rate in the system as an alternative measure of
monetary policy stance.5 As seen in ￿gures 2a and 2b, the direction of the e⁄ect once again
conforms with our intuition: a rise in the interest rate discourages entry, with signi￿cance
in the net business formation case. Our conclusion from this exercise is that there appears
to be a relationship between monetary policy and entry. This invites theoretical exploration
of how entry might operate as part of the monetary policy transmission process and how it
might a⁄ect optimal policy design.
3 The model
We consider a closed economy where households consume a basket of di⁄erentiated tradable
goods, demanding positive quantities of all the goods available in the market. They supply
labor to ￿rms and own claims on ￿rms￿pro￿ts. We scale the economy such that there are
Lt households in the economy.
The number of goods varieties produced by ￿rms is endogenously determined in the
model. To start production of a particular good variety, ￿rms sustain entry costs consisting
of the costs of intermediate inputs required to set up a ￿rm￿ s capital. Once the entry
costs are paid, ￿rms start producing with a period lag. They operate under conditions of
monopolistic competition: in equilibrium ￿rms will choose to produce one speci￿c variety
only. Hence, an increase in nt corresponds to both the introduction of new varieties, and
the creation of new ￿rms. For simplicity, we assume that, at the end of this period the
capital invested in the creation of a speci￿c variety fully depreciates and the production
process starts again with new entry of ￿rms. Firms and goods varieties are de￿ned over a
continuum of mass nt and indexed by h 2 [0; nt].
The government is assumed to set monetary policy, collect seigniorage, and rebate any
surplus to households in a lump-sum function.
3.1 Households
The utility of the representative national household is a positive function of consumption
Ct and money holding Mt=Pt and a negative function of labor e⁄ort ‘t ￿whereas Pt is the
welfare based consumption price index (de￿ned below) and Mt is the stock of money that
5The variable list now consists of: industrial production, CPI, commodity price, federal funds rate,
nonborrowed reserves ratio, and an entry measure.
6the representative household chooses to hold during the period. As household preferences
are de￿ned over a very large set of goods, utility is a well-de￿ned (and non-decreasing)
function of all goods available in the market.
The representative household maximizes
P1
t=0 ￿
tU (Ct), whereas utility in period t is:


















As in Benassy (1996) and the working paper version of Dixit and Stiglitz (1974), in our
speci￿cation of preferences the parameter ￿ denotes the elasticity of intratemporal (i.e.,
across varieties) substitution, with ￿ ￿ 1, and the parameter ￿ measures the degree of
consumers￿love for variety: ￿ ￿ 1 represents the marginal utility gain from spreading a
given amount of consumption on a basket that includes one additional good variety (see
Corsetti Martin and Pesenti, 2005). In what follows, we will conveniently restrict the value
of the ￿ to be close to ￿
￿￿1, so that our speci￿cation of consumption is close to the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz case.6
In each period, households buy st(h) shares in the ￿rm h (which start operating in the
following period) at the price qt (h). At the same time, they receive dividend payments




pt (h)Ct (h)dh +
Z nt+1
0




st￿1(h)￿t (h)dh ￿ Tt + (1 + it)Bt￿1 + Mt￿1
where pt(h) denotes the price of variety h; st(h) is the share of ￿rm h purchased in period
t; wt is the nominal wage rate; ￿t(h) is ￿rm h￿ s total dividend paid in period t; T are lump-
sum net taxes denominated in Home currency, Bt is the household￿ s holding of a nominal
bond (in zero net supply), and i is the nominal interest rate. Note that consumption falls
on nt goods, ￿nancial investment on nt+1 shares.
6By assuming log preferences, we restrict our attention to economies with a well de￿ned balanced growth
path. However, we also abstract from potentially interesting wealth e⁄ects on labor supply (see Corsetti,
Martin and Pesenti, 2005).
73.2 Firms and the government
The representative ￿rm producing a speci￿c variety h has access to the following production
function:
Yt(h) = ￿t‘t(h) (5)
where Y (h) is the output of variety h, ‘(h) is labor used in its production, and ￿t is a
country-speci￿c labor productivity innovation that is common to all Home ￿rms.
To start the production of a variety h at time t + 1, at time t a ￿rm needs to install Kt













which is a direct analog to the love of variety in consumption. For a given requirement Kt,
a higher e¢ ciency index AK;t implies a smaller demand of goods
R nt
0 K(h)dh.
Let pt(h) denote the price of variety h. From cost minimization, we can derive the



















Observe that in a symmetric equilibrium the demand for the good h is K(h) = Kt=n￿k.
The entry costs q(h) faced by a ￿rm are thus equal to:
qt(h) = PK;tKt (7)
For simplicity, in what follows we assume 100 percent depreciation: after paying the ￿xed
cost, a ￿rm can produce variety h in period t + 1 only.
Since we assume that households will demand any number of varieties supplied in the
market, from the vantage point of a new ￿rm it will never be pro￿table to produce a
particular variety already produced by other ￿rms, rather than introducing a new one. Hence
in equilibrium ￿rms are monopolistic suppliers of one good only. The resource constraint
for variety h is:
Yt(h) ￿ LtCt (h) + nt+1Kt (h) (8)
8where Ct (h) is consumption of good h by the representative Household, while the second
term on the RHS is the demand for investment goods by all the ￿rms that will be producing
in t + 1.
Households and ￿rms will be symmetric in equilibrium. Hence we can write the h ￿rm￿ s
operating pro￿ts as:
￿t (h) ￿ pt (h)LtCt (h) + pt (h)nt+1Kt (h) ￿ wt‘t (h) (9)
We posit that ￿rms are atomistic, so that they ignore the e⁄ect of their pricing decision on
the price level.
Domestic households provide labor to ￿rms for both start-up and production activities.







We abstract from public consumption expenditure. The government uses seigniorage
revenues and taxes to ￿nance transfers. The public budget constraint is simply:
Mt ￿ Mt￿1 +
Z Lt
0
Tt(j)dj = Mt ￿ Mt￿1 + LtTt = 0 (11)
and in equilibrium money supply equals demand, or Mt =
R Lt
0 Mt(j)dj. Finally, the bond
is in zero net supply: Z 1
0
Bt(j)dj = 0: (12)
so that Bt = 0 in aggregate terms. Throughout our analysis we will consider two sources
of uncertainty. labor productivity ￿t and investment requirement for entry Kt are random
variables.
3.3 Equilibrium allocation
The representative Home household maximizes (1) with respect to Ct(h), ‘t, Bt, st (h) and









wt = ￿PtCt (14)
1
PtCt






























Note that households will ￿nance new ￿rms as long as the present discounted value of










With competitive markets and free entry, the number of ￿rms will adjust until the above
holds with an equality sign. Following Corsetti and Pesenti [2005a] it is convenient to de￿ne








The ￿rst is a measure of monetary stance. The second is the stochastic discount factor.
We introduce nominal rigidities by assuming that ￿rms preset the price of their products
before shocks are realized (i.e. simultaneously to the decision to enter), and stand ready to
meet demand at the ongoing price. Hence, the entry decision coincides with the optimal
choice of this price for the period of production. Firms choose their price maximizing the
expected discounted value of their pro￿ts
Maxp(h) Et [Qt;t+1￿t+1 (h)] ￿
Maxp(h) Et fQt;t+1 [Lt+1pt+1 (h)Ct+1 (h) + nt+2pt+1 (h)Kt+1 (h) ￿ wt+1‘t+1 (h)]g
Using the ￿rst order conditions of the representative household, the price indices, and the
de￿nition of ￿ we can also rewrite the ￿rm￿ s problem as

























































7We note here that, with preset prices, large negative shocks may make ex post operating pro￿ts negative
￿raising an issue of whether ￿rms will voluntarily accept to produce even if they are loosing money. For
simplicity, we rule this possibility out by restricting the support of the shock (as discussed in Corsetti and
Pesenti, 2001).
10It is easy to verify that, with ￿ exible prices, the optimal price set at time will take the
well-known form






where MC stands for marginal costs.
We have seen above that free entry in a competitive market implies qt(h) = Et [￿Qt;t+1￿t+1(h)].
Substituting the ￿rst order conditions of the representative household￿ s problem and using























This expression and equation (19) summarize the macroeconomic process in our economy.
4 Flex-price equilibrium and welfare with monopolistic
distortions
In this section, we analyze the ￿ exible price equilibrium allocation and its welfare proper-
ties relative to a Pareto-optimal allocation, with the goal of providing useful positive and
normative benchmarks for the analysis to follow. Using (19) and (20), the dynamics of an











































where the superscript ￿ ￿ ex￿stands for ￿ exible-price equilibrium, and without loss of gener-
ality we have set ￿s = 1 for all s. Clearly, money is neutral. Investment in entry however
responds to productivity shocks.
4.1 Real shocks and economic dynamics
From (22), the entry cost qt (on the left hand side of the expression) falls with positive
innovations to investment e¢ ciency (corresponding to a fall in Kt) and/or with positive
shocks to ￿t (in a ￿ ex price equilibrium, productivity gains reduce current goods prices,
decreasing the costs of investment). Entry in turn reduces expected pro￿ts, restoring equi-
librium. Observe that entry reduces pro￿ts from both consumption sales (￿rst term in the
squared brackets of (22)) and investment sales (second term).
These e⁄ects are illustrated by Figure 3, which plots the e⁄ect of a persistent rise in
productivity in a linearized and calibrated version of the model.8 Relative to the standard
8Calibrated values are: ￿ = 6; ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 = 1:2;￿K = 1, ￿ = 1; serial correlation in shock ￿￿ = 0:9;
K = 0:012; L = 1.
11model without entry, the e⁄ect of the shock on output is larger, as it includes the demand
for investment. Since in our calibrated economy investment is 16% of output in steady state,
output is approximately 16% larger.9 Observe also that once ￿rms have a chance to enter,
the rise in output generated by the shock operates at the extensive margin, with no increase
in average ￿rm size at the intensive margin. This must be the case in equilibrium, since
any rise in ￿rm size would indicate there were extra sales and hence pro￿ts net of the ￿xed
entry costs which potential entrants are not exploiting. The e⁄ects of a 1% drop in entry
cost, Kt, are illustrated in ￿gure 4. New ￿rms enter and ￿rm size falls proportionately, as
an unchanged level of output is divided among the larger number of ￿rms.
An anticipated shock to marginal costs (￿t+1), however, has ambiguous e⁄ects on the
allocation. While it encourages entry because of its e⁄ect on future entry costs (investment
will be cheaper in the future), its impact on future goods prices is not necessarily good news
for pro￿tability. Intuitively, with falling marginal cost, each ￿rm will try to increase pro￿ts
by lowering its own price. But since the shock is common to all, in the new equilibrium the
product prices will be uniformly lower, reducing pro￿ts.
The above equation also suggests that the number of ￿rms temporarily rises in response
to an anticipated higher investment requirement (a higher Kt+1, which is a negative shock to
expectations about the investment technology). By the same token, nt is higher in response
to anticipated growth in market size (a larger Lt+1).10
Observe that with e¢ ciency gains in investment due to goods variety (￿K 6= 1), the
expression (22) is a non linear second-order di⁄erence equation in n: any temporary de-
viations of n from its long run value induce persistent e⁄ects on the costs of investment.
Hence investment demand and entry change over time in response to any shock, also driving
consumption demand. These e⁄ects would disappear as the system returns to steady state.
To gain further insight on the equilibrium allocation, it is analytically convenient to
focus on the case of a stationary economy with i.i.d. shocks to productivity and no serial
dependence in entry (￿K = 1). Expected discounted pro￿ts are constant, and entry is di-
rectly proportional to current productivity shocks ￿t while varying inversely with investment





















9It is easy to show that in this economy the steady state share of investment expenditure in output
equals
￿
￿, so it does not depend at all on the calibration of the ￿xed cost parameter K (which is di¢ cult to
calibrate).
10See Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2005) for an analysis of similar results in an open economy.

































In a stationary economy with ￿ exible prices, the number of ￿rms moves in proportion to the
productivity index Kt=￿t. If K is constant, all the adjustment takes place at the extensive
margin: ￿rm size is una⁄ected.
By using the resource constraint of the economy, we also obtain a second important









The equilibrium rate of employment is constant. Output and entry (along the intensive
and the extensive margins) ￿ uctuates with productivity. Adding up quantities across goods
(ignoring di⁄erences across products), this economy produces ￿tL‘flex. Of this aggregate
quantity, a proportion ￿=￿ goes into investment, (￿￿￿)=￿ into consumption. Unless ￿ = 1,
however, these quantities are not appropriate measures of GNP, C and I, because they
ignore the utility value of product diversi￿cation.
4.2 Entry and Pareto e¢ ciency
In our economy, a competitive allocation can be characterized by either excessive or in-
su¢ cient creation of varieties, depending on the interaction between love for variety and






















As in the market equilibrium, the Pareto-optimal number of varieties in a stationary econ-







￿L(￿ ￿ 1) (25)
Observe ￿rst that, ￿ ! 1 implies that nP:O:
t+1 ! 0, while n
flex
t+1 tends to a positive number.
In the case of no love for varieties, the e¢ cient mass of varieties is zero: it would be e¢ cient
for ￿rms to supply only one good variety, at a price equal to the marginal cost. But this
would clearly be inconsistent with a market allocation, as ￿rms would not be able to ￿nance
their entry costs.








￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
It is easy to verify that this ratio will be larger than unity with a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
in consumption, i.e. for ￿ ! ￿
￿￿1. A market allocation would not deliver enough product
diversity. To gain further insight, posit ￿ ’ 1. In the Dixit-Stiglitz case, the above ratio is
then approximately equal to 1￿1=￿: the lower the elasticity of substitution across products,
the larger ￿rms￿monopoly power, the larger the gap in variety between a market allocation
and the Pareto optimal allocation.11
By the same token, compare individual consumption in a ￿ ex price equilibrium and a



































The wedge in consumption depends on two sources of ine¢ ciency: the markup charged
by ￿rms; and the equilibrium supply of varieties, that however only matters if ￿ > 1.
Distortions in the labor market will also be a function of the ￿ gap￿in the number of varieties.

















while the wedge of employment in investment activities between a Pareto Optimal and a








[1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)] (26)
In general, as a decentralized equilibrium generally will not be Pareto e¢ cient, welfare-
optimizing policymakers would want to adopt ￿scal instruments to correct distortions. An
instance of an optimal ￿scal policy correcting monopolistic distortions consists of subsidies
to production and investment, ￿nanced with lump-sum taxation. The former induce ￿rms
11Using the above expression, it is also easy to calculate which value of ￿ would make the number of ￿rms
in a competitive equilibrium converge to the Pareto optimal number of ￿rms. This happens to be the case
when ￿ is close to 1 + 1=￿. It is worth stressing that, even if ￿ happens to be equal to 1 + 1=￿, the market
allocation will not be Pareto-optimal, because of monopoly power in production.
14to raise production up the point in which prices equal to marginal costs (therefore making
expected discounted pro￿ts identically equal to zero). The subsidy covering the costs of
entry should be limited to a mass of goods variety optimally chosen in relation to e¢ ciency
gains in preferences ￿ however the amount of information required to pursue such policy
in practice is unrealistically large.
Relative to the standard macroeconomic model with imperfect competition but a given
set of varieties, therefore, an explicit speci￿cation of entry costs is helpful in clarifying
the source of monopoly power in production. Entry and market dynamics is nonetheless
distorted, creating a need for a ￿scal correction similar in spirit to the interventions envisaged
by recent contributions on monetary policy, whereas appropriate taxes are assumed in order
to approximate the market equilibrium (with an optimal monetary policy in place) around
the ￿rst-best allocation.
5 Nominal rigidities and the transmission of monetary
and real shocks
With nominal rigidities, the macroeconomic process in a symmetric equilibrium is described






















































Hereafter, we will use these conditions to trace the transmission of monetary and real shocks.
Clearly, money is not neutral. Consider a once-and-for-all unanticipated temporary
shock to ￿ at time t (money stocks go back to their initial value from t + 1 on). From
the RHS of the above equation, we see that a monetary shock ￿t that lowers real interest
rates translates into a higher discount factor, therefore boosting expected discounted pro￿ts.
With preset goods prices the overall entry costs does not change.12 Hence, by reducing the
real interest rate a temporary monetary shock will lead to entry: at time t + 1 there will
be a higher number of ￿rms and goods. Since the number of ￿rms is predetermined and
cannot rise in the same period in which the shock occurs, the rise in demand (for both
investment and consumption) driven by a monetary shock is met by a rise in output per
12In our model nominal wages move in proportion to the nominal shock, raising the marginal costs of
￿rms supplying goods to new ￿rms. If entry costs consisted exclusively of labor input, a nominal shock
raising the present discounted value of pro￿ts in nominal terms, would also raise entry costs proportionally.
There would be no e⁄ect on entry.
15￿rm solely at the intensive margin. The extensive margin takes e⁄ect only after one period,
when the number of ￿rms rises. We stress the analogy in the monetary transmission channel
between this model with entry and standard models without entry but with investment in
physical capital. The e⁄ect of expansionary monetary shocks on the e⁄ective real interest
rate induces a rise in consumption demand and investment (the latter via a raise in expected
discounted pro￿ts), which translates into higher real output.
Figure 5 illustrates the e⁄ects of a monetary shock using the linearized and calibrated
version of the model.13 Observe ￿rst that, just as with the productivity shock discussed in
the previous section, entry raises the output e⁄ects of monetary shocks. In the experiment
in Figure 5, steady state investment is about 12% of output and the rise in output is
approximately by this amount.14 Since we set ￿K 6= 1, there is some persistence in the
e⁄ect of a monetary shock on entry. In the second period after the shock, there still is a
noticeable amount of extra ￿rms, due to the fact that the larger number of varieties available
in the previous period make entry less costly. However, persistence in the e⁄ect of money
on entry does not translate into persistence in the e⁄ect on output.
Perhaps most interesting is the observation that, with endogenous entry, the in￿ ationary
e⁄ects of monetary expansion are diminished by about 17%. Under love of variety, the rise in
entry works to lower the cost of one unit of the consumption index. This indicates that the
in￿ ationary consequences of monetary expansions may be less severe than suggested by the
o¢ cial measures of the CPI, to the extent that these fail to properly take into consideration
entry and variety e⁄ects.
As prices are preset during the period, temporary productivity shocks (changes in ￿t
lasting only one period) do not impact either the allocation of consumption or entry ￿
they cause temporary employment ￿ uctuations. Productivity shocks to ￿t can a⁄ect entry
if they are persistent, as illustrated in Figure 6. The e⁄ects of such a shock closely resemble
those of the ￿ exible price case, though entry is delayed an extra period. This is because
under sticky prices it takes a period before the productivity gain is able to lower prices and
hence entry costs. Regarding a shock to entry costs (Kt), since this shock did not imply any
change in marginal cost or price setting under the ￿ exible price case discussed previously,
the e⁄ects under sticky prices are the same as those shown previously in ￿gure 4. Thus,
di⁄erent from productivity innovations to ￿t, shocks to investment e¢ ciency raise nt+1 also
when prices are sticky.
13Calibrated values are the same as in the previous simulation, exept that we re-introduce love of variety
in investment (￿K = ￿): ￿ = 6; ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 = 1:2;￿K = 1:2, ￿ = 1; K = 0:012; L = 1.
14The steady state investment share no longer exactly equals exactdly
￿
￿ since love of variety in investment
a⁄ects the investment price index.
166 Monetary policy rules and the consequences of lack
of stabilization
In this section we turn to stabilization policy, focusing on the e⁄ects of monetary rules,
whereas we express our indicator of monetary stance ￿ as a function of exogenous shocks to
productivity. To facilitate analytical solution, we again limit ourselves to the case of i.i.d.
shocks and no serial dependence in entry (￿K = 1).
6.1 Monetary rules supporting a ￿ ex-price allocation
A ￿rst question regards the conditions (if any) under which there exist monetary rules
that support a ￿ ex-price and ￿ ex-wage allocation. The answer is positive: in our economy
there exists a class of policy rules that equalize the allocation across market equilibria with
and without nominal rigidities. Such a class is identical to the one studied by Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005a,b) for a much simpler economy without entry. Suppose that monetary
authorities pursue policy rules such that
￿t = ￿t￿t
at all times, whereas ￿t is a possibly time-varying variable anchoring the level of nominal
prices. Setting ￿t = 1 for simplicity, it is easy to verify that marginal costs are identically





In other words, marginal costs are completely stabilized. Using this expression in the free
entry condition, we obtain exactly the same expression characterizing a ￿ ex price allocation
(22). As discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b), this result nicely generalizes to more
articulated speci￿cations of nominal rigidities, including costs of nominal price adjustment
or Calvo-Yun pricing, which allow some price ￿ exibility ex post (either by all ￿rms, or by
some ￿rms only). The reason is that rules that stabilize marginal costs take away any
incentive to change prices ex post. A ￿rm that can re-optimize its pricing decisions would
not alter the nominal price of its product. Observe that randomness in Kt per se does not
create any policy trade-o⁄ for policy makers, as (independently of price stickiness) entry
￿ uctuates endogenously in response to it.
In an economy with the above rule in place, the individual good prices p are constant,
but the welfare-based CPI comoves negatively with entry. For exactly this reason, the goal
of (welfare-based) CPI stability may not be a good target for policy makers. To the extent
that it is desirable to support a ￿ ex price allocation, monetary authorities should stabilize
17￿rms￿marginal costs and product prices, not the CPI. The price level should instead move
freely with entry, providing information about ￿ uctuation in consumption utils which ￿
given prices ￿ households enjoy.
As discussed above, however, pursuing policy rules that ensure ￿t = ￿t will not be
su¢ cient to ensure a Pareto optimal allocation. This is because monopoly pricing distorts
consumptions and labor, and the supply of varieties may be too large or too small. The
above monetary stabilization rule in general must be complemented with appropriate taxes
and subsidies.
It is nonetheless useful to analyze the behavior of our economy when no taxes or subsidies
address these supply side distortions, as to dissect the macroeconomic implications of a lack
of stabilization. Posit that monetary authorities pursue policy rules implying:
￿ = ￿￿; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
i.e., they pursue rules that make them react to productivity shocks only, although they may
react to them with di⁄erent intensity. When ￿ = 1, clearly ￿ = ￿: we are in the case
discussed above, whereas stabilization rules are supporting a ￿ ex-price allocation. When
￿ ￿ 1, instead, stabilization is ￿ incomplete,￿in the sense that policy makers do not fully
stabilize marginal costs and product prices.
6.2 Incomplete stabilization
What are the consequences of incomplete stabilization? For tractability in what follows we
keep our assumption that productivity is stationarity, so that in equilibrium nt+2 will be
independent of nt+1. Also, we set ￿ = 0: monetary authorities do not react to shocks at
all, and money evolves along some deterministic path. This would be the case if the central
bank let money grow at some rate that may vary over time, but it is not contingent on








Since marginal cost is a convex function, the above expression is increasing in the variance
of ￿: the higher the uncertainty about future productivity, the higher the preset price. Note
that with i.i.d. shocks, goods price will be constant.
Comparing optimal prices in the case of complete stabilization (￿ = 1) and no stabi-
lization (￿ = 0) of productivity shocks yields a conclusion consistent with the analysis in
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b). Prices are higher in the absence of stabilization.15 Marginal
15If a fraction of ￿rms can re-optimize their prices within the period, then lack of stabilization would also
translate into in￿ation variability, as some prices would rise or fall with marginal costs.
18cost uncertainty exacerbates monopolistic distortions in the economy, creating a production
ine¢ ciency. Without stabilization, ￿rms employment will tend to grow when productivity
is low, while it will fall when productivity is high. Expected employment is constant, but
average output falls relative to the ￿ ex price equilibrium.
In the model with a ￿xed number of varieties by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a, b), lack of
stabilization implies that because of nominal rigidities employment falls suboptimally when
productivity is high, while rise suboptimally when productivity is low. For a given average
employment level, this implies that output and consumption will be below the average level
in a ￿ ex price equilibrium. The same can be said regarding the level of output of each
￿rm in our economy with entry. To generalize such result to the aggregate level of output,
however, we ￿rst need to establish what happens to the number of ￿rms and goods varieties
in an equilibrium without stabilization.
Observe that i.i.d. shocks to ￿ do not translate into any ￿ uctuation in entry: given
goods prices (30), random ￿ uctuations in productivity only a⁄ect employment and output,
not investment or consumption. The number of ￿rms nt+1 will only vary with K. Using




































































Conversely, in a ￿ ex-price equilibrium, or in an equilibrium with complete stabilization,
investment ￿ uctuates with the state of the economy: the number of ￿rms rises when pro-
ductivity is high and/or investment requirement is low. Using (30) in (28) setting ￿t = ￿t,

































Comparing the two expressions (32) and (33): since the covariance term is negative (as a











On average, for any given path of K, there are more varieties and ￿rms in a fully stabilized
economy (whose allocation coincides with the ￿ exible price allocation).
19In principle, one might have conjectured that higher preset prices due to lack of sta-
bilization (our ￿rst result above) may actually encourage entry by raising expected pro￿ts
(the opposite of our second result). This conjecture however ignores the fact that higher
goods prices also raise investment costs. Overall, in our economy above entry is discouraged
by lack of stabilization.
Observe that in our distorted economy with no stabilization, employment suboptimally
￿ uctuates with productivity shocks, falling when these are high and vice-versa. These
shocks open output gaps that are not (but should be) counteracted by stabilization policy.
In our framework, the gap between output with ￿ exible prices ￿tL‘flex, and output with












Yet, as shown in appendix, with i.i.d. shocks expected employment in an economy with
sticky price but no stabilization is still constant at its ￿ ex-price (natural) level:
Et￿1‘no stabilize = ‘flex:
i,e. it is identical to expected labor supply in a fully stabilized economy. Hence, ex ante,
lack of stabilization does not impinge on expected disutility from labor.
6.3 Welfare
In the previous subsection, we have shown that lack of monetary policy means that prices
are high and entry is low, and on average consumption and output are below their level
in a fully stabilized economy. Now, when love of variety conforms to Dixit Stiglitz with
￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), lack of stabilization is surely detrimental to welfare. Monopolistic distortions
are exacerbated, and the number of varieties falls relative to an already suboptimal (average)
level. Can we be sure that incomplete stabilization is detrimental in general, also when the
number of varieties in a market allocation is too high from a welfare perspective?
To address this question, we ￿rst derive an analytically tractable expression for the
expected utility of the representative households. Since expected employment is constant
at its ￿ ex price level, expected utility only varies with the expected (log of) consumption
(see the appendix). Thus, in a stationary economy:
E0Ut = E0 lnCt + constant: = E0 [ln(￿t) ￿ lnPt] + constant:
With symmetry among ￿rms, the price level varies inversely with entry: Pt = n1￿￿p.
Abstracting from constant terms (independent of stabilization policies) expected utility can
20then be written:
E0Ut = E0 [ln(￿t) + (￿ ￿ 1)lnnt ￿ lnpt]






; with full stabilization,
￿ = ￿, p = ￿￿
￿￿1. The di⁄erence in expected utility in the two cases simpli￿es to
E0Ustabilize
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which (provided the marginal bene￿t of variety is nonnegative ￿ ￿1 ￿ 0) is unambiguously
positive. Intuitively, even when the market supply of product diversi￿cation is excessive
from a welfare perspective, it is not a good idea to give up macroeconomic stabilization on
the ground that this would, on average, lower the number of varieties. This is because, as
shown above, lack of stabilization also raise prices, therefore exacerbating (welfare-reducing)
monopolistic distortions in the economy, and depressing consumption and average output.
We also note that the welfare wedge that can be attributed to failure to stabilize marginal
costs is rising in productivity uncertainty, as captured by the ￿rst term on the right hand
side of the above expression.











































































= E0 (Et￿1 ln(￿t) ￿ Et￿1 ln(￿t) + 0:5vart￿1 (ln￿t))
= 0:5vart￿1 (ln￿t)
So to simplify the earlier expression:
E0Ustabilize
t ￿E0Uno stabilize
t = 0:5var(ln￿t)+(￿￿1)[0:5vart￿1 (ln￿t)] =
￿
2
vart￿1 (ln￿t) > 0
That is, the utility gap opened by insu¢ cient stabilization becomes proportional to the
variability of productivity shocks. Note that in our set up, such gap is already expressed
21in terms of equivalent units of consumption, that equate welfare in an economy with full
stabilization and in an economy without stabilization. To wit:
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A ￿rst conclusion we can draw is that welfare gains from stabilization are therefore of the
same order of magnitude as Lucas (1987, 2003). However, there is now a new element. Love
for variety tends to amplify these gains: to the extent that stabilization raises average entry,
preferences for product variety add another dimension to the costs of lack of stabilization.
In particular, for the love of varity implied by the standard Dixit-Stiglitz speci￿cation,
￿ = ￿
￿￿1, the welfare cost of business cycle ￿ uctuations is ampli￿ed by this same value,
￿
￿￿1, which one may recall also turns out to be the equilibrium price markup charged by
optimizing ￿rms over marginal costs. This con￿rms the point made in the introduction, that
the extra welfare cost of entry ￿ uctuations is of the same magnitude as the price markup.
7 Endogenous entry and market competitiveness
The analysis above showed that there is a role for stabilization policy to improve welfare
by a⁄ecting the number of entrants, provided there is love for variety in consumption.
Another reason why the number of entrants might a⁄ect welfare is that this may in￿ uence
the degree of competitiveness within markets. One way to get at this idea is to use the
endogenous markup implied by translog preferences, as discussed in Bergin and Feenstra
(2000) and Feenstra (2003). Building on Feenstra (2003), characterize household preferences
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Here we have included an additive term ATL;t to capture love of variety, and an extra scale
parameter ￿ to scale the demand elasticity for use later. As in the CES preferences in
22previous sections, ￿ = 1 (ATL = 0) indicates no love of variety. Note that aggregating
this price index over identical ￿rms delivers the same price index as equation (18) for the
previous set of preferences:




We use (35) to compute the demand function facing each ￿rm. We compute the share of
spending going to each good (s(h)) as the derivative of the unit cost function with respect

























Note that when aggregating over identical ￿rms, this produces the same allocation of demand
over varieties as in the previous model in equation (13): ct(h) = Ct=n
￿
t :
Denoting the time-varying demand elasticity as ￿t, one can compute 1￿￿t as the deriva-











= ￿￿(nt ￿ 1)
This indicates that the demand elasticity facing a variety is ￿t = 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ nt). For the
special case of ￿ = 1, ￿t = n, the elasticity equals the number of entrants. But if we wish
to consider cases with a large number of entrants, the scale parameter ￿ can be set small.
Combining the demand facing a ￿rm (38) with the ￿rm price setting problem from earlier






































which is identical to the price-setting equilibrium condition from the previous version of the
model, except that the constant demand elasticity ￿ has been replaced by the time-varying
elasticity that is a function of the number of entrants. We restrict the number of ￿rms
to be large enough, so that ￿rms take the elasticity as beyond their control. Note that
23while this elasticity is time varying, it is known at the time prices are set. So it remains
like the earlier model in this respect without adding an extra dimension of uncertainty
to complicate model solution. Once aggregated over identical ￿rms, all other equilibrium
conditions remain unchanged.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the dynamics for shocks in the linear approximation to the
model.16 Observe ￿rst that in each case the markup in pricing falls in inverse proportion
to the new entry. This is a useful implication, since countercyclical markups are a well-
documented feature of business cycle data (see Bills, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991).
Next observe that there is now some positive persistence in the e⁄ects of monetary policy on
output, though the e⁄ect is small. Finally, observe that the initial impact on entry for both
shocks is about half of that observed with CES preferences and exogenous markups. The
reason is that as more entry drives down the markup and hence pro￿ts, it takes fewer new
entrants to drive monopolistic pro￿ts back down to the ￿xed entry cost. One interesting
implication of this feature, is that now the rise in output is evenly split between the extensive
and intensive margins, rather than all taking place at the extensive margin whenever entry
is permitted. While empirical work is yet to be done on the precise breakdown of output
deviations into intensive and extensive margins, the fact that endogenous markups allow
this breakdown to be calibrated will likely prove useful as future research brings models of
entry to the data.
The fact that the endogenous markup generates some persistence here means that serial
dependence no longer can be eliminated by choosing ￿K = 1. This precludes the type of
analytical solution used in the previous section to rank formally the e⁄ects of alternative
monetary policies on entry and welfare analysis. Nonetheless, it is clear that endogenous
markups provide an additional reason why entry matters for welfare. As more ￿rms enter
and the market becomes more dense, the demand elasticity rises and markups fall, reducing
the monopolistic distortion in the market. Consequently, this version of the model should
predict an even wider range of cases where policies promoting greater entry would improve
welfare.
8 Conclusion
This paper explores some basic monetary policy issues in a model with ￿rm entry. We use
a stylized model in which ￿rms use monopoly pro￿ts to pay a ￿xed cost of entry prior to
16The calibration is the same as previous cases, with the additional parameter ￿ set to unity. So ￿ = 6;
￿ = ￿
￿￿1 = 1:2;￿K = 1 for productivity for the shock experiment and 1:2 for the monetary shock experiment,
￿ = 1; K = 0:012; L = 1.
24each period of production, and in which prices are preset one period. In this context entry
has implications for the transmission of monetary and technology shocks, with features
similar to investment dynamics in standard models without entry. However, entry matters
in terms of its implications for welfare, working through either love of variety in preferences,
or the possibility that new entry may raise competitiveness in the market and reduce the
monopolistic distortion.
We analyze reasons why stabilization policy has a role to play in promoting entry. Pre-
vious literature has shown that, absent stabilization policy, uncertainty about productivity
induces ￿rms to raise their markups and thereby lower welfare relative to their level in the
￿ ex-price allocation. In this paper we replicate this result in an economy with entry. In
addition, we show that, on average, uncertainty also lowers entry relative to a ￿ ex-price al-
location. Since the amount of entry can a⁄ect welfare in the ways noted above, stabilization
policy has an additional role in regulating the optimal number of entrants, as well as the
optimal level of production per ￿rm.
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In general, the model is highly non linear, and the steady state allocation may not be unique.
In some special cases, however, the solution becomes quite tractable. If ￿k = 1, for
instance, the number of ￿rms and varieties is
n￿￿(￿￿1)  =
￿ ￿ L





(￿ ￿ ￿) +
1
￿
Note that, as long as   is not too large ￿so that the exponent of n is positive ￿the number
of ￿rms is increasing in the size of the country and patience (i.e., increasing in L and ￿),
and decreasing in entry costs (i.e., decreasing in K, increasing in ￿). Lower marginal costs
(an increase in productivity ￿) have however ambiguous implications.
Furthermore, with K = 0, the expression simpli￿es to
n[￿￿(￿￿1) ] =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ L
￿1￿  (￿ ￿ 1)
1￿  (￿￿)
 
When entry costs consist of labor costs only, and   is su¢ ciently high, higher manufacturing
productivity (a higher ￿) leads to exit in steady state (i.e., it leads to a lower n).
Pareto optimal allocation
This section of the appendix sets the planner problem and characterize the e¢ cient alloca-
tion. Write the resource constraint for individual good h


















t LtCt + nt+1n
1￿￿K
t Kt
Combining this expression with technology
￿tLt‘t = ntYt(h)





































The ￿rst order conditions with respect to ‘ and C are































































































which we use in the text. It is easy to verify that e¢ cient labor supply is constant and equal
to (26) in the text.
Ranking entry over policy rules
In this section of the appendix, we derive the expressions (32) and (33) discussed in the







































t+1 Kt = ￿
￿￿1























We see here that the product nno stabilize
t+1 Kt is a function of constants and expectations
dated t, which are constant. So nno stabilize
t+1 Kt is not time varying under this policy rule.





































































































Entry is serially independent, expectations of the product of nno stabilize
￿+1 K￿ are the same











































































Since with nominal rigidities,entry does not respond to productivity shocks, as discussed
above, we know that in the case of i:i:d: shocks the covariance terms on the right hand side
is zero. We therefore can write (32) in the text.
Second, consider the case of stabilization policy with ￿t = ￿t, in which case the allocation























































































































































































































































The expression (33) in the text follows.
Expected labor supply and the natural rate of employment
In this appendix we derive the expected labor supply under nominal rigidities. Using the

































































ivIn the case of full stabilization of marginal costs, the monetary rule replicates the ￿ exible






























































































































exactly as for the previous case above, leading to the same result for Et￿1‘
no￿stabilize
t = ‘flex.
v